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Abstract We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of 
assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best 
answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We 
consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and 
show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones 
where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic 
credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the 
epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only 
the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the 
universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely 
unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some 
assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly. 
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0. 
 
Assertion can be usefully characterized, following Weiner (2005: 4) as ‘a genus that 
comprises species such as reports, predictions, arguments, reminders, and speculations’. 
The task of providing of necessary and sufficient conditions under which some speech act 
qualifies as an assertion is a well-worn and difficult one, as is that of clarifying what 
precisely distinguishes assertions from other non-assertoric declarative speech acts.1 . Our 
interest in this paper is, however, not to weigh in substantively here by defending any 
particular theory of assertion, as such. Rather, our topic will be norms of assertion –
which are to be understood as rules governing what counts as a proper or uncriticisable 
assertion. These are importantly distinct from rules that would tell us what an assertion 
actually is. 
                                                
1 See McFarlane (2010). Also, see Cappelen (2009) for a defence of the “no assertion view”. 
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To begin with, we shall discuss three of the most prominent attempts to isolate 
some epistemic norm to which assertions are answerable: the knowledge norm, the truth 
norm, and the justification norm. Our first aim here will simply be to elucidate these 
accounts, though it is worth noting at the outset that there are considerations in support of 
the claim that each of these main views is distinctly unsatisfactory.  
 
1.1 
We begin with the strongest and historically most well-supported of the three most 
popular norms of assertion—the knowledge norm (Williamson 1996, 2000; DeRose 
2002; Fricker 2007; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005, among others). According to all 
formulations of the knowledge norm of assertion, it is epistemically improper to say what 
one doesn’t know to be true. Obviously, we frequently violate the knowledge norm, 
rendering a lot (or, some might want to say, all) of our assertions improper, and 
concurrently rendering ourselves subject to criticism as asserters. The most widely 
discussed and compelling defence of the knowledge norm is Williamson’s (1996, 2000). 
There are many subtly different formulations of the knowledge norm, but in order to 
render it immune to trivial and obvious counterexamples, we submit that the knowledge 
norm can (following Lackey (2007)) be most helpfully formulated in the following way: 
 
Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA): One is properly epistemically positioned 
to assert that p only if one knows that p)2. 
 
As Brown (2008: 90) has pointed out, this claim has been commonly defended as 
both a necessity claim and a sufficiency claim: 
 
 Knowledge Norm (Necessity Claim): One is properly epistemically positioned 
 to assert that p only if one knows that p.  
 
 Knowledge Norm (Sufficiency Claim): One is properly epistemically 
 positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. 
 
Support for the knowledge norm tends to largely be drawn from its explanatory 
power. Firstly, Williamson (1996; 2000) has claimed that the act of asserting involves the 
speaker representing himself as knowing, and that it is therefore only acceptable to assert 
if we know (as opposed to merely justifiably believe). Arguably a virtue of the 
knowledge norm is that it appears best suited to explain two particularly problematic 
types of assertions—seemingly paradoxical Moorean assertions, and the impermissible 
                                                
2 In all of our formulations of the proposed norms of assertion, the inclusion of “epistemically positioned” 
(as opposed to simply “positioned”) accounts for the fact that the epistemic state to which the norm refers 
might be insufficient for various kinds of non-epistemic propriety. Formulations of the norms that lack such 
a qualification would be open to obvious and philosophically uninteresting counterexamples. 
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assertion of lottery propositions. A classic example of a Moorean assertion is “Dogs bark, 
but I don’t know that they do” or “Dogs bark, but I don’t believe that they do”, whilst an 
example of a problematic lottery proposition assertion would be “Your ticket didn’t win!” 
if said by someone with no inside information (at a time between the drawing of a lottery 
and an announcement of the winner). When it comes to Moorean sentences, the 
knowledge norm offers a satisfying explanation of why they are paradoxical because, 
given that knowledge entails belief, you can permissibly assert such sentences only if you 
believe both that p and that ~p. 
Regarding the assertion of lottery propositions, the knowledge norm makes 
straightforward sense of why you should not assert them—you may have a highly 
justified belief in lottery propositions but (prior to the drawing of a lottery and in the 
absence of any inside information) you do not know lottery propositions. 
Much of the literature espousing the knowledge norm focuses mainly on the 
necessity claim, according to which one is never properly epistemically positioned to 
assert unless one knows.3 However, there is also explicit support for the claim that the 
knowledge norm is sufficient for proper assertion, according to which one is always 
properly epistemically positioned to assert if one knows.4  
At the opposite end of the spectrum to the knowledge norm of assertion, we find 
the weakest of the three most prominent answers to the assertion question in the 
contemporary debate—the truth norm of assertion (as primarily advocated by Weiner, 
2005). 
 
Truth Norm of Assertion (TNA): One is properly epistemically positioned to 
assert that p only if p is true. 
 
Why, then, should we suppose that truth might be the norm of assertion? Arguably, it is 
satisfyingly inclusive in the way in which is allows for the existence of cases where 
assertions are wholly proper even though the truth that is asserted is (according to 
orthodox definitions) not known. Weiner (2005: 8) suggests that the bulk of intuitively 
correct assertions that are not expressions of knowledge will be predictions and 
retroindications. An example of the former would be something like an experienced 
political analyst making the utterance “The exit polls correctly indicate which party will 
win this election”, whilst an example of the latter could be something along the lines of 
“Steff ate the last cookie—everyone else in the house would have asked before eating it!” 
It is often thought that the knowledge norm is too strong, whilst the truth norm is 
too weak5; this brings us to a plausible alternative to the Truth Norm (TNA) and the 
Knowledge Norm (KNA)—the Justification Norm of Assertion (JNA). It is weaker than 
                                                
3 The knowledge norm specifically as a necessary condition for assertion is normally attributed to 
Williamson (e.g. 2000), and also gains substantial support from DeRose (e.g. 2002), Unger (1975), 
Hawthorne (e.g. 2004), Fricker (e.g. 2007), and Stanley (e.g. 2005).  
4 DeRose (2002) is the main advocate of this position, but implicit or briefly stated support can also be 
found in Reynolds (2002), Hawthorne (2004), and Stanley (2008). 
 
5 After all, it would seem that an asserter who asserts a proposition on scant evidence, or as the result of 
prejudice or superstition, is epistemically criticisable even if the assertion turns out to be true. This counts 
in favour of the idea that whatever norm governs assertion epistemically will be sensitive not only to the 
truth value of the assertion but also to the epistemic grounds possessed by the asserter. 
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the Knowledge Norm, yet stronger than the Truth Norm, and there are at least three 
prominent formulations—defended by Douven6 (2008), Lackey7 (2007) and Kvanvig 
(2009). The most straightforward and inclusive articulation, Kvanvig’s (2009), claims: 
 
Justification Norm of Assertion (JNA): one is properly epistemically positioned 
to assert that p only if one has good reasons or justification for p. 
 
Two sorts of cases recommend this view. First, take cases where one has excellent 
epistemic grounds for believing a proposition which happens to be false. For example, 
Lewis might believe that James is at the opera on excellent epistemic grounds (e.g. he 
sees his car parked outside, and he knows James enjoys the opera.) He asserts “James is 
at the opera.” Even if we suppose this claim is false—James, it turns out, parked at the 
opera and instead took an inspired stroll—it’s counterintuitive to fault Lewis for his 
assertion. The JNA, unlike the KNA and TNA, accommodates the sense in which we find 
assertions on the basis of good evidence blameless, regardless of whether the assertion is 
true. Such cases favor JNA as appropriately inclusive, where KNA and TNA seem in 
comparison too exclusive. 
A second sort of case is offered by proponents of JNA to separate specifically 
from the TNA: suppose Jesper is a victim asked to identify the perpetrator of an assault 
against him in a line-up. Jesper doesn’t remember what the criminal looked like, but 
wants someone to pay, and so asserts: “It was Person No.3 who attacked me.” Even if it 
were No. 3 who attacked Jesper (and so his assertion was true), it seems plausible to 
contend that Jesper’s assertion was improper given that Jesper lacked the appropriate sort 
of evidential grounds. This sort of case favors JNA as appropriately exclusive, where 
TNA seems in comparison too inclusive. 
  
1.2  
 
Overwhelmingly, philosophers have, against this background, attempted to advance the 
mainstream debate via the strategy of defending one of these three proposed norms 
against the other two. Invariably, this strategy requires one take a stand on the matter of 
how much epistemic support8 is needed for one to properly assert what she does. The 
                                                
6 Douven (2008) defends what he calls the Rationally Credible Norm of Assertion. According to this norm: 
One is properly epistemically positioned to assert only what is rationally credible to one. 
7 Lackey (2007) defends what she calls the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion according to which 
one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p only if (i) it is reasonable to one to believe that p, 
and (ii) if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to 
believe that p. One supporting case that Lackey uses to show how her norm works involves a woman 
asserting that a co-worker forget to turn the alarm on before leaving work because she does not want to be 
suspected for this error herself, even though she loves that co-worker in a way that actually prevents her 
from rationally suspecting him. Here, this woman’s assertion is obviously improper, and the reasonable to 
believe norm gives just this result—even though the asserted proposition is reasonable, it is not asserted 
because it is reasonable. 
8 We do not mean to imply here that the property of a belief constituted in it’s ‘being true’ constitutes 
epistemic support for the belief. Though the truth and knowledge accounts of assertion differ from 
justification accounts on the point of whether asserted beliefs must have the property of being true to be 
warranted, the relevant point we make is that what distinguishes each view uniquely from the others is the 
matter of how much epistemic support is warranted for assertion. 
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options become: 
 
(i) none, so long as the belief asserted is true (the truth account); 
(ii) some, regardless of whether the belief is true (the justification account), or; 
(iii) support sufficient for the asserted true belief to qualify as knowledge (the 
knowledge account). 
 
 What this reveals is a crucial presupposition internal to the debate. This 
presupposition, held by defenders of all three of the main rival views, is what we will call 
the quantitative view: 
 
 Quantitative View: The question “What is the norm of assertion?” is best 
 answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant 
 assertion. 
 
By presupposing the quantitative view in attempting to answer the question “What 
is the norm of assertion?”, defenders of all three accounts reveal their commitment to a 
gradient account of epistemic support. This would be an account according to which, for 
a subject S who asserts propositional content α, if S knows α, then S has maximal 
epistemic support for α. Thus, on the quantitative view presupposed by the mainstream 
debate, if S knows what one asserts, then S satisfies (in virtue of having maximal 
epistemic support for her assertion) the norm of assertion, whatever it might be. 
 
The mainstream debate, then, is committed not only to the quantitative view, but also to 
what we called in section (1) the knowledge norm sufficiency claim (hereafter SUFF): 
 
 Knowledge Norm (Sufficiency Claim) (SUFF): One is properly epistemically 
 positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. 
 
Importantly, SUFF stands as a commitment of whichever of the three mainstream 
candidates for the norm of assertion (truth, justification or knowledge) is endorsed. If 
SUFF is false, then, this would count not only against the knowledge norm, but also 
against the quantitative view presupposed by all three mainstream accounts. 
Consequently, if SUFF is false, then the question “What is the norm of assertion?” is not 
best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant 
assertion. This would be a significant result, the implications of which we will set aside 
for now. The present task will be to consider whether SUFF (and a fortiori the 
quantitative view that presupposes it) does in fact hold. 
2.1 
 
Our challenge to SUFF—and by extension, to the quantitative view—is one that becomes 
apparent when considering some recent literature on the epistemology of testimony. 
Firstly, however, some very brief background is in order. A central dividing line in the 
epistemology of testimony concerns the epistemic burden that should fall on the recipient 
of testimonial knowledge. On this score, reductionists hold that one must have additional 
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(i.e. non-testimonially dependent) reasons for accepting some item of testimony if one is 
to possess testimonial knowledge.9 Non-reductionists, on the other hand, reject this 
requirement that additional reasons over and above the testimony itself are required for 
the possession of testimonial knowledge.10  
 Some cases are particularly conducive to highlighting how it is that reductionism 
and non-reductionism would come apart. “Stranger-directions cases”, for instance, are 
ones in which the non-reductionist will be more inclined than the reductionist to award 
testimonial knowledge; after all, apart from the fact that the informant says what he says 
concerning the directions he gives, you have no independent (i.e. non-testimonial) reason 
to believe what it is that he has said. You would have such reasons, however, if you 
already knew that the informant were pretty competent on the subject matter at hand (i.e. 
that he was someone who had been to the area several times). You would have especially 
(perhaps maximally) strong independent reasons to trust a given piece of testimony if the 
informant was one you identify as a full-fledged expert on the subject matter at hand (i.e. 
a local navigator/cartographer). Absent any defeaters, then, it is uncontroversial (for both 
reductionists and non-reductionists alike) that truthful testimony from a knowledgeable 
and correctly identified expert (on the matter at hand) is sufficient as a source of 
knowledge. 
 With this idea in mind, we’ll see that certain cases of testimonial knowledge 
exchange pose a direct challenge to the claim that one is properly epistemically 
positioned to assert that p if one knows that p (SUFF). For an example of such a case, 
consider Jennifer Lackey’s (2008) recent DOCTOR case:  
 
DOCTOR: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has been diagnosing and treating 
various kinds of cancers for the past fifteen years. One of her patients, Derek, was recently referred to 
her office because he has been experiencing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. After 
requesting an ultrasound and MRI, the results of the tests arrived on Matilda’s day off; consequently, 
all of the relevant data were reviewed by Nancy, a competent medical student in oncology training at 
her hospital. Being able to confer for only a very brief period of time prior to Derek’s appointment 
today, Nancy communicated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without 
offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her conclusion. Shortly 
thereafter, Matilda had her appointment with Derek, where she truly asserts to him purely on the basis 
of Nancy’s reliable testimony, “I am very sorry to tell you this, but you have pancreatic cancer. 
(Lackey 2008: 3-4) 
 
Here Matilda heard first-hand that Derek has pancreatic cancer, from a fellow expert 
(Nancy) who looked at Derek’s charts, so she knows that he has pancreatic cancer. 
However, is it nonetheless the case that Matilda is not epistemically positioned to assert 
this knowledge to Derek? In Lackey’s own assessment of DOCTOR, she writes: 
 
The question we must now consider is whether, under these conditions, Matilda is properly 
epistemically positioned to flat out assert to Derek that he has pancreatic cancer. And here the answer 
is clearly no. (Lackey 2008: 6). 
 
                                                
9 For some recent defences of reductionism, see Lyons (1997), Lipton (1998), Lehrer (2006), Van Cleve 
(2006) and Fricker (1995).  
10 For some recent defences of non-reductionism, see Welbourne (1979), Audi (1997), Burge (1993), Foley 
(1994) and McDowell (1994). 
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 If Lackey is right that Matilda is not properly epistemically positioned to assert to 
Derek that he has pancreatic cancer then, given the by and large uncontroversial fact that 
expert testimony (in the absence of defeaters) is good enough for knowledge11, we have 
good cause to deny SUFF—that one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if 
one knows that p. Further, if we deny SUFF, then we of course at the same time 
undermine the quantitative view undergirding all three central assertoric norms).  
 Two questions now become especially salient. Firstly, is Lackey’s assessment of 
the case correct? And secondly, if so, then what (if not knowledge) is the epistemic 
credential required to warrant assertion in cases the class of which the DOCTOR case is 
characteristic? The rest of this section will center around the first question, and the next 
section will concern the second. 
 
2.2  
 
We turn, then, to our first question: is Lackey’s assessment of the DOCTOR case correct? 
More specifically, is Lackey right that this case demonstrates an instance in which an 
individual (i.e. Matilda) both: 
 
(i) has knowledge that p 
(ii) is not properly epistemically situated to assert that p? 
 
Given that Matilda learned that p from the reliable, undefeated testimony of an expert 
(Diane), she counts as knowing p, and so (i) is satisfied. Is (ii) satisfied? On Lackey’s 
view, Matilda was not epistemically situated to assert that p because, in virtue of Diane’s 
recognition of Matilda as an expert, there are certain epistemic expectations at play that 
Matilda fails to meet, even though she knows what she asserts. Consider, for one thing, 
that Derek would plausibly be miffed to learn that Matilda had diagnosed him without 
seeing his charts or examining him.12 Derek would be within his rights to expect Matilda 
to have a better grasp of his situation epistemically than she did.13 According to Lackey, 
the specific epistemic expectation at play here is that Matilda not merely have what 
                                                
11 That we have excellent reason not to deny this uncontroversial assumption is not solely due to the fact 
that it is considered uncontroversial across the reductionist/non-reductionist debate, but also because of 
considerations related to skepticism—ones that should be held in mind regardless of what one’s 
commitments are in the epistemology of testimony. After all, testimony is ubiquitous as a source of human 
knowledge, and expert testimony (in the absence of defeaters) is testimony at its best. To question whether 
expert testimony (absent defeaters) is good enough for knowledge is to offer up to the sceptic testimonial 
knowledge more generally—a considerable and unpalatable concession to the sceptic indeed. 
12 Lackey adds some helpful detail here. She writes: ‘One reason for this is that Matilda is an expert—she is 
an oncologist and Derek’s physician, and such roles carry with them certain epistemic duties. In DOCTOR, 
these responsibilities may include having reviewed the test results firsthand, possessing reasons for 
choosing one condition over another, knowing details about the size and nature of the cancer, and so on. 
But the overarching epistemic duty here is that, qua oncologist, Matilda should be able to (at lest partially) 
explain or justify the diagnosis of pancreatic cancer that she is offering to her patient. Moreover, as her 
patient, Derek reasonably has the right to expect his doctor to fulfill such a duty.’ (2007: 6) 
13 On this point, Lackey adds further that when ‘asserters are experts who are offering assertions in contexts 
that call for their expertise… they are expected to be able to defend or offer support for the assertions that 
they make when occupying such roles.’ (Lackey 2008: 7). 
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Lackey calls isolated second-hand knowledge. Of isolated second-hand knowledge, 
Lackey says: 
 
There are two central components to this phenomenon: first, the subject in question knows that p 
solely on the basis of another speaker’s testimony that p—hence the knowledge is secondhand; and, 
second, the subject knows nothing (or very little) relevant about the matter other than that p—hence 
the knowledge is isolated. The combination of these features, by itself, is not necessarily problematic, 
even when assertion is involved. But when a subject’s assertion that p is grounded in such knowledge 
in contexts where the hearer reasonably has the right to expect the asserter to possess more than 
merely isolated secondhand knowledge, there is a problem. (Lackey 2008: 5) 
 
In the DOCTOR case, though Matilda knows what she asserts, she is not epistemically 
situated to assert it because, qua expert, Matilda is expected to assert on the basis of more 
than merely isolated, second-hand knowledge. This, at least, is how Lackey’s argument 
runs. 
The argument can be generalized so that we might generate a recipe for 
counterexamples to SUFF. The counterexamples would have to demonstrate (contra what 
SUFF maintains) that, as was the case in DOCTOR, one can both: 
 
(i) know that p 
(ii) not be properly epistemically situated to assert that p 
 
Cases where both (i) and (ii) hold must simply14 be ones that have the following three 
features: 
 
(C1): The speaker knows p on the basis of undefeated testimony from an identified 
expert. (vouchsafes (i)) 
(C2): The subject knows that p solely on the basis of another speaker’s testimony that p 
(i.e. second-hand) (vouchsafes (ii)) 
(C3): The subject knows nothing (or very little) relevant about the matter other than p 
(i.e. isolated) (vouchsafes (ii)) 
 
Cases in which (C1-C3) hold, then, will be counterexamples to SUFF. Before considering 
and replying to some objections to this counterexample-style argument against SUFF, 
let’s consider a parallel case Lackey offers in which (C1-C3) also hold: 
 
RECOMMENDATION: Josie, who was asked to support a philosophy student applying to Ph.D. 
programs, wrote in her letter of recommendation for his applications, “Mitchell has very polished 
writing skills.” While Josie does indeed know this about the student, her knowledge is grounded 
purely in the isolated, reliable testimony of her trustworthy colleague. Josie herself has had Mitchell in 
class for only a few weeks, and has yet to see any of his writing. (Lackey 2008: 13) 
 
Notice that the same structural features (i.e. C1-C3) that were present in DOCTOR are 
                                                
14 We are claiming here that satisfaction of C1-C3 would ensure that (i) and (ii) hold. We’re not claiming 
that satisfying C1-C3 are necessary for satisfying (i) and (ii) and thus generating a counterexample to 
SUFF. We leave open the possibility that other cases where one or more of C1-C3 are not satisfied and yet 
(i) and (ii) are satisfied. We maintain only that the satisfaction of C1-C3 is one ‘recipe’ for guaranteeing 
countercases to (i) and (ii)—and this is the recipe that is followed by Lackey’s examples. 
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present in RECOMMENDATION. Josie satisfies C1 because she knows that Mitchell 
“has polished writing skills” on the basis of reliable undefeated testimony from a fellow 
professor with expertise on the matter. C2 is satisfied because Josie knows about 
Mitchell’s writing skills only on the basis of what her colleague told her, and C3 is 
satisfied because Josie knows absolutely nothing about Mitchell’s writing skills (other 
than what her colleague told her). Consequently, and contra-SUFF, both (i) and (ii) hold: 
Julie knows that Mitchell has polished writing skills but she is not epistemically situated 
to assert that he does. Julie’s hearer (i.e. the recipient of the letter) has epistemic 
expectations about Julie’s grasp of what she, qua expert, asserts, and—given that Julie 
has merely isolated second-hand knowledge on the matter—Julie in fact fails these 
expectations. 
 It would appear, then, that DOCTOR and RECOMMENDATION are 
counterexamples to SUFF and, by extension, they are also cases that undermine the 
quantitative view that our three theories of epistemic assertoric norms presuppose. We 
will shortly be considering the question of what (if not knowledge) is the epistemic 
credential required to warrant assertion in cases the class of which the DOCTOR and 
RECOMMENDATION cases are characteristic15—i.e. cases where C1-C3 hold. First, 
however, let’s consider some objections to the claim that these sort of cases should lead 
us to abandon SUFF16. 
 
2.3.1  
 
Peter Milne (2010) has recently argued against several recent criticisms17 of the 
knowledge norm, and presented several different challenges to Lackey’s isolated second-
hand knowledge cases against SUFF. We will discuss the strongest of them here. Milne’s 
central objection to rejecting SUFF via counterexample the way Lackey has is the claim 
that the fault of the asserter (in her counterexample cases, such as DOCTOR and 
RECOMMENDATION) is not, as Lackey maintains, epistemic, but rather, social. Milne 
highlights the DOCTOR case as an example.18 Here’s Milne: 
 
Social roles can require, in some normative way, that someone asserting p must be in a position to provide 
evidence of a certain kind, and be in a position to assert the relevant evidential propositions (as Shieber 
                                                
15 We take this up in some detail in § 3. 
16 At this point, we could point out that further weakening the sufficiency claim of the knowledge norm 
would make it immune to these sorts of counterexamples. We could amend the sufficiency claim to read 
only that one has the quantity of epistemic support required to properly assert that p if one knows that p—
this is compatible with the claim that knowledge isn’t sufficient to have the quality of epistemic support 
demanded by proper assertion. However, (i) this represents an extreme weakening of the sufficiency claim 
of the knowledge norm (as it clearly concedes that knowledge is not qualitatively sufficient for 
epistemically proper assertion), and (ii) a high-stakes practical context case can be construed as a 
counterexample to this ultra-weak knowledge norm, i.e. as showing that knowledge isn’t even sufficient for 
possessing the quantity of epistemic support required for proper assertion. It seems as though proper 
assertion in high-stakes cases might require more than knowledge, so even the very weak version of SUFF 
is lacking in plausibility.  
17 Sheiber (2009), Koethe (2009) and Judith Jarvis-Thompson (2008). 
 
18 Milne writes: ‘…Lackey speaks of Derek feeling epistemically cheated if Matilda cannot back up her 
assertion in the way expected of an oncological expert (Lackey forthcoming, pp. 6-7) … Lackey does 
nothing to show that the defect, if such it is, is epistemic.’ (Milne 2010: pp. 15-16). 
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would have it one must in responding to the question, ‘How do you know?’). But it is a mistake to think 
that it follows from this that epistemic entitlement to asserting p must, in this case, include possession of 
that evidential basis. Criticism faced for asserting p on the basis, say, of isolated second-hand knowledge is 
not epistemic. It is failure to perform the social role that is criticised. (Milne 2010: 16) 
 
What Milne has overlooked here is that ‘passing-the-buck’ of criticism to the violation of 
some social role will only lead to having the buck passed right back to the epistemic 
shortcomings of the asserter who occupies such a role. This is because, contra what Milne 
suggests, the relevant order of explanation is backwards. This much is evident in 
Lackey’s rather detailed observation (2009: 25-28) that the ‘social role’ criticism is easily 
dispelled once it’s recognized that: 
 
… the assertions involving isolated secondhand knowledge are not epistemically problematic because 
various institutions say that they are wrong; rather, the institutions say that they are wrong because 
such assertions are epistemically problematic. (Lackey 2009: 25)19 
 
In DOCTOR and RECOMMENDATION, the knowledgeable asserter fails to satisfy the 
epistemic expectations of the hearer, and that’s why the assertions are epistemically 
inappropriate—not because they violate the norms of some institutional role they occupy 
as opposed to violating the epistemic expectations that make various social roles more or 
less epistemically credible. This particular worry, then, can be put to rest. 
 
2.3.2  
 
Before moving on, we also want to quickly show why Lackey’s counterexamples to 
SUFF cannot be set aside simply by appealing to the idea that what’s wrong with the 
assertions (of the protagonists in the counterexample cases) is not some epistemic defect 
but rather the violation of some Gricean20 conversational norm. Perhaps, as the argument 
might go, Matilda’s assertion is incorrect because she has implied by her assertion that 
she has a better grasp of Derek’s medical situation than she actually does (having not 
seen his charts or examined him); perhaps, likewise, Judith’s assertion is incorrect 
because she implies by her assertion that she has taught Mitchell and read his work. 
 Objections of this style are misguided, but our reasoning here is different from 
that of Williamson (2000) when he simply waves away Gricean-style objections to the 
knowledge norm by claiming them to be examples in which the knowledge norm is 
satisfied but is simply overridden by other, non-epistemic norms (such as Gricean 
conversational norms). As we see it, Gricean-style cases (or, indeed, any other sort of 
                                                
19 To see why this point is plausible, Lackey asks us to consider what would happen if the institutions 
changed such that it was no longer improper to offer assertions grounded purely in isolated secondhand 
knowledge. If, for instance, the medical profession changed so that diagnoses from specialists could be 
grounded entirely in a single instance of reliable testimony, this institution would no longer serve the 
epistemic purpose for which it was created. Patients would no longer regard the medical verdict of an 
expert as having a certain kind of epistemic authority, and thus they would cease to consult with specialists 
to obtain precisely the specialized information that the medical profession intended these doctors to 
provide. (Lackey 2009: 23) 
20 See Grice 1969, ‘Utterer's Meaning and Intentions’, The Philosophical Review, 78: 147–77 and 
especially Grice (1989) Studies in the Ways of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
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case) would be pertinent to the knowledge norm, and potentially undermining of it, if and 
only if, the cases show that it is due to a lack of epistemic warrant that the assertion at 
issue is improper. Of course, many ‘Gricean-style’ cases are ones in which an assertion’s 
impropriety is entirely non-epistemic. For example, you might have plenty of epistemic 
warrant to tell Lyle Lovett that are plenty of singers with voices purer and faces more 
symmetrical. It would not be proper to assert this (i.e. to Lovett’s face) even though you 
have ample epistemic grounds for what you asserted. Here, the impropriety of your 
assertion owes to the violation of a Gricean conversational norm, and not of any rule 
according to which certain epistemic grounds are required to warrant proper assertion.  
 That said, it’s important to note that violating a Gricean conversational norm is 
perfectly compatible with lacking the epistemic warrant to properly assert. This 
compatibility could certainly occur (for example) in cases in which someone (i) misleads 
someone else (and therefore violates the Gricean norm according to which misleading 
statements are improper) and (ii) lacks appropriate epistemic credentials to assert. A 
natural way for this to happen in everyday discourse will be when someone misleads 
someone else (thus violating the Gricean norm not to mislead) specifically by implying 
that they have greater epistemic warrant for their assertions than they actually do.  
 That, we contend, is precisely what seems to be going on in our counter-cases to 
SUFF. A Gricean (non-misleading) norm is violated because one lacks certain epistemic 
credentials expected of them in virtue of occupying various roles of expertise. We can 
dispel, then, the mistaken (though initially appealing) idea that the objections we 
considered to SUFF can be shrugged off as simply cases where Gricean norms are 
violated. We’ll agree with this much and add that the Gricean norm (of not misleading) is 
violated because of the impoverishment of the asserter’s epistemic situation—this, itself, 
is sufficient to explain the impropriety of the assertion.  
 With SUFF dispelled, then, we have no reason to think that the strategy for 
answering the question ‘what is the norm of assertion?’ should be as the quantitative 
view suggests—i.e. by asking how much epistemic support (for the proposition’s being 
true) is required to warrant assertion. Perhaps we should be asking a different question. 
Lackey alludes to such a question—the question of what kind of epistemic support (as 
opposed to how much epistemic support) warrants assertion.21 Lackey herself does not 
pursue this question; our next section, however, will be entirely focused on considering 
just this question’ 
 
 
3.  
 
We will now turn to examine what, epistemically speaking, the protagonists in the 
isolated second-hand knowledge cases lack.  
                                                
21 We have not taken a stand at this point on whether all assertions would be answerable to the same 
epistemic norm governing their appropriateness or whether different epistemic norms might govern 
different classes of assertions. So, in asking this question, we do not intend to imply that some particular 
norm (of a particular quality) should govern all assertions uniformly. Whether one should is a point we will 
take up later in the paper. 
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We now intend to advance a positive thesis—specifically, we want to argue that 
the lack of appropriate epistemic credentials to assert in these cases owes to the fact that 
the speakers lack (the relevant sort of) understanding. Firstly, however, it is important to 
make clear what kinds of understanding are contenders for what appears to be missing in 
cases of isolated secondhand knowledge. We can then go on to explore whether any of 
these specific sorts of understanding seem to be required of (and yet lacked by) the 
speakers in cases like DOCTOR and RECOMMENDATION (i.e., cases which share 
features (C1-C3) from the previous section). 
 
3.1  
 
There are three obvious candidates in the mainstream literature on understanding in 
epistemology. To begin with, there is what is usually called propositional understanding 
(e.g. Kvanvig 2003: 191-192), represented by such sentences as ‘I understand that X’. 
Secondly, in sentences that take the form ‘I understand why/when/where/what X’, we 
find non-holistic or atomistic understanding (e.g. Pritchard, 2010: 75), or what is 
sometimes called understanding-wh22 (e.g. Brogaard, 2005: 6). Finally, there is what has 
been termed objectual understanding (Kvanvig 2003: 191-192) (or, less commonly (e.g. 
Pritchard 2010: 75), holistic understanding). This is the sort that we attain when we have 
understanding of some subject matter, such as music theory, quantum physics, or another 
person about whom we have a comprehensive amount of accurate information. It is 
expressed in sentences that take the form ‘I understand X’. Which, then, of these main 
three forms of understanding is missing in the cases of isolated secondhand knowledge 
that we have discussed? We will argue that in fact more than one of these forms of 
understanding is absent, but that it is a particular instance of one of these types of 
understanding that makes it such that the speaker lacks the correct epistemic credentials 
to assert. 
We might at first be tempted to respond to, for instance, the DOCTOR case by 
saying ‘Matilda knew that Derek had cancer, but the problem was that she didn’t 
understand that Derek had cancer!’. We might then think that this reaction means that it 
is propositional understanding that is missing in these cases (of which DOCTOR is 
paradigmatic). However, our line here is actually that so-called ‘propositional 
understanding’ is no kind of understanding at all, and that it is a philosophically 
uninteresting construal of what it is to understand. We take it that what appear to be 
attributions of propositional understanding occur only in cases where one of two different 
sorts of misspeaking is occurring. Either (i) the speaker means that the subject of her 
sentence knows some proposition, or (ii) the speaker is hedging23 for reasons of doubt or 
                                                
22 It is worth noting here that some (e.g. Pritchard, 2010) suppose that one type of understanding-wh, 
specifically understanding-why, is paradigmatic and also the most interesting breed of understanding. 
 
23 An example of hedging of this sort might be ‘I understand that the train leaves at seven o’clock’, which 
means something closer to ‘I believe that the train leaves at seven o’clock, but I have at least some cause to 
doubt this’. Another example is ‘I understood that you would be home earlier’, which is intended to soften 
the potentially confrontational fact that the hearer’s behaviour did not meet the speakers expectations. We 
base these examples on similar cases from Kvanvig (2003), who uses them for a different purpose (i.e. to 
explain away apparently non-factive uses of understanding). 
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social convention. Clearly, since (i) the problem with cases of isolated secondhand 
knowledge is by definition not that the speaker lacks knowledge, and (ii) it simply 
doesn’t make sense to think that what is lacked is whatever epistemic state features in 
cases of hedging, we can therefore dismiss propositional understanding as an implausible 
candidate for the epistemic credentials appropriate for assertion in such cases as 
DOCTOR24. 
As we have seen, what is problematic in cases like DOCTOR and 
RECOMMENDATION is the quality of the speaker’s epistemic credentials (something 
intimately connected with the evidence they have in support of their assertion). Given this 
fact, another claim that might seem intuitively attractive is that the type of understanding 
missing in those cases is most likely to be the most comprehensive and desirable type that 
it is possible to possess. Since having objectual understanding amounts to having 
understanding of a subject matter, it is reasonable to say that it would be, ceteris paribus, 
the sort of understanding that is comprised of the largest amount of true beliefs, and also 
the sort that requires a grasp of the largest amount of relations between beliefs. Should 
we, then, allege that the speakers in cases like DOCTOR and RECOMMENDATION 
lack the adequate epistemic credentials because they lack objectual understanding? 
On closer inspection, it becomes obvious that we should not. It is a mistake to 
claim that speakers like the ones in the isolated secondhand knowledge cases should not 
assert unless they have objectual understanding of the relevant subject matter—somewhat 
surprisingly, having objectual understanding of the relevant subject matter would not 
automatically make their assertions permissible. As we will now show, objectual 
understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for assertion in cases of isolated 
secondhand knowledge. To see why this is the case, first consider that in DOCTOR, it 
seems as though the relevant subject matter that Matilda would have to understand would 
be cancer25. Consider also that it is also a plausible assumption that one necessary 
condition of understanding a subject matter is the possession of all the beliefs that are 
central to that subject matter. Assuming that this is correct, then, no matter which precise 
beliefs are central to understanding the subject matter of cancer, if objectual 
understanding is the norm of assertion here then it is obvious that Matilda needs to know 
much more than the specific results of Derek’s tests. Indeed, she must have true beliefs 
                                                
24 Fully defending this claim about propositional understanding is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
if you are not convinced by our brief outline of the ‘misspeaking’ theory, you might see its plausibility if 
you notice that when one tries to spell out the difference between propositional understanding and 
knowledge, one immediately starts offering up features that are almost uncontroversially possessed of 
atomistic and/or objectual understanding—chiefly, a grasp of the relations that cohere separate (but related) 
true beliefs.  
25 We think that cancer is the most plausible subject matter here because (i) it is uncontroversially 
considered a subject matter in itself (e.g. in medical school and textbooks), and (ii) other available options 
such as ‘medicine’ and ‘Derek’s cancer’ seem too large and too ad hoc respectively to be the subject matter 
required here. However, even if we are mistaken and one of these other options is actually the relevant 
subject matter, it is still the case that objectual understanding of either is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
permissible assertion of Derek’s diagnosis. In the former case, this is because (like ‘cancer’), the subject 
matter of ‘medicine’ is unwarrantedly large. In the latter case, it is because making the subject matter as 
small as ‘Derek’s cancer’ to avoid our claim about necessity and sufficiency means that the type of 
understanding in the relevant norm of assertion actually collapses into atomistic understanding—
specifically, understanding why something is the case. 
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about many things entirely unrelated to his particular case for it to be appropriate for her 
to assert the diagnosis to him. 
This is too strong a demand to make regarding the permissibility of assertions. 
Suppose that Matilda knows everything about Derek’s results and has expertise on the 
matter of cancer diagnosis, but that she does not, on balance, have objectual 
understanding of cancer. In this set of circumstances, it doesn’t seem though she is still 
criticisable for asserting to Derek that his diagnosis is pancreatic cancer. Now, imagine 
that the test results are reported by someone who is perfectly competent at accurately 
interpreting results that show the irrefutable presence or lack of cancer in all its possible 
locations, but build in the idea that this person doesn’t have the understanding of cancer 
that (say) an oncologist would have. We do not think that Derek would feel cheated if he 
had this results reported by this person, and learned these facts about the person. He 
might not go to this person for advice on treatment, or to grasp the harder topic of why 
cancer occurs in human beings, but he would surely have no problem with this person 
being the one to first report his diagnosis to him. He would not require that the asserter of 
the diagnosis also grasp how the disease arises, how often (and in what manner) it can be 
cured, and all the other central facts of which the subject matter of cancer is comprised. 
We would even go so far as to say that he would probably even have no quibble with the 
person asserting the diagnosis if, in the domain of cancer, they only had a very 
specialized, specific and narrow ability to correctly interpret results of tests for pancreatic 
cancer. All of the foregoing considerations show that objectual understanding is not 
necessary for assertion in cases of isolated secondhand knowledge. What would irk Derek 
in DOCTOR (we will argue) is if Matilda, the asserter of his diagnosis, didn’t have 
understanding that is more specific.  
Interestingly, nor does objectual understanding turn out to be sufficient for 
assertion in these types of cases. Matilda might understand cancer—in fact, we could 
even change the case to make her one of the world’s foremost experts—but if she is not 
personally familiar with the finer details of Derek’s diagnosis and is reporting on the 
basis of merely knowing (by way of reliable, results-based testimony) that he has cancer, 
then the intuition remains that she is doing something wrong when she asserts the 
diagnosis to Derek. He would be irked if this expert asserting his diagnosis did not 
understand more about his particular case of cancer, no matter how much she happened to 
know about the field more generally. So, now that we have seen that objectual 
understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for permissible assertion in these kinds 
of cases, we can justifiably put objectual understanding aside as a plausible candidate for 
the epistemic credential that is importantly missing in DOCTOR and 
RECOMMENDATION. It is missing, yes, but its presence would not make the 
protagonists’ assertions permissible. 
We contend that the sort of understanding lacked in these cases (and others that 
take the same form) is one kind of atomistic understanding. Specifically, we think it is 
understanding-why that is absent. This is something that Matilda blatantly lacks in a 
number of different formulations—for example, she doesn’t understand why the asserted 
proposition (i.e. that Derek has pancreatic cancer) is true. However, we do not think that 
this is the important item of atomistic understanding that is lacking. As in the case of 
objectual understanding above, to ask her to understand why the asserted proposition is 
true would be to ask for quite a bit too much. To understand why ‘Derek has pancreatic 
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cancer’ is true, she would have to know why Derek developed cancer—for example, she 
might have to know a story involving his having a parent who died of the disease, as well 
as his having a helicobacter pylori infection and a persistent problem with obesity.  The 
sentence  ‘Derek has cancer because…’ is not a sentence that one is able to fill out simply 
by having become fully, personally acquainted with Derek’s test results and having 
concluded that those results are indicative of pancreatic cancer (while excluding all other 
potential diagnoses). It is not a sentence that Derek would reasonably expert the bearer of 
his test results to be able to complete unless they happened to know more about his life or 
habits. Further, to have atomistic understanding of why ‘Derek has cancer’ is true, 
Matilda would not necessarily even have to be acquainted with the specifics of his test 
results, and so having this item of atomistic understanding present in the DOCTOR case 
would not just automatically make it such that Matilda’s assertion is permissible. It is 
possible that she might just have atomistic understanding of why Derek has cancer by 
way of being a personal friend of Derek’s, or even a friend of his sister’s, for example. 
Were this to be the case, Matilda would therefore know enough about the casual story to 
understand why he has cancer, whilst still lacking the credentials required to permissibly 
assert his diagnosis. It must, then, be a different item of atomistic understanding that is 
required and lacking in DOCTOR. 
Specifically, we think that Matilda importantly lacks atomistic understanding of 
why Derek’s condition was diagnosed as it was. In DOCTOR, she knows that he was 
diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, but not what grounds Nancy (who had seen the test 
results herself) had to assert this diagnosis. To permissibly assert, it is intuitive that 
Matilda needs to at least know about the specifics of Derek’s test results (in order to 
know that his results are consistent with pancreatic cancer, and to know that his results 
rule out any competing diagnoses to that of a cancer diagnosis). If she understood why 
his condition was diagnosed as it was, she would know the details of his test results, and 
she would be able to complete the sentence “Derek was given a pancreatic cancer 
diagnosis because ____” in a way that is appropriately informative and not merely 
tautological. Similarly, in RECOMMENDATION, for Josie’s assertion to be permissible 
she needs to know the relevant specifics about Mitchell’s writing, in order to know what 
is polished about his writing (whether it be his impressive vocabulary, his use of imagery, 
something else entirely, or a combination of many different features). What Josie lacks is 
understanding of why Mitchell’s writing was described as it was. 
A given item of atomistic understanding (whether it be understanding of where, 
when, what or why p) is plausibly thought to feature some central true belief. In 
DOCTOR, that true belief is that Derek’s results exclusively indicate pancreatic cancer. 
However, we also posit that to have atomistic understanding, the central true belief must 
be based on the relevant type of familiarity (e.g., in this case such familiarity as that 
which arises from seeing his test results, or perhaps hearing the exact details of what the 
ultrasound and MRI showed, and so on). We take it that this aforementioned relevance 
has something to do with the role played by the agent (i.e., a role that leads to the justified 
expectation that they have relevant insight rooted in a certain type and degree of 
familiarity). 
What, then, does this familiarity have to involve? Given the natural differences in 
the institutional roles occupied by testifiers, a sweeping definition that permits all correct 
sorts of familiarly and yet excludes all types that are insufficient is simply not plausible. 
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For example, if a judge asserts that a person from his court is innocent of the charges laid 
against her, the relevant familiarity upon which the judge’s belief is based might involve 
seeing evidential documents, hearing witness testimony, or some combination of both. 
However, if a high school maths teacher asserts that a pupil’s answer should be five and 
not four, she must be familiar with the equations and sorts of problems that she is 
teaching and evaluating answers to—in virtue of being a maths teacher, she takes on the 
epistemic expectation that she be familiar with not just what counts as a right answer in 
high school level maths, but also why a given answer is wrong or right when it is26. 
The norm of assertion that is violated in cases of isolated secondhand knowledge, 
then, is atomistic understanding of why p (the asserted proposition) is evaluated as being 
as it is. Cases featuring weak experts are ones that also support the existence of this 
norm. A strong expert, we might say, is a leader in their field, and so one of whom we 
already have especially high epistemic expectations that they have some sort of a special 
objectual understanding when they say anything related to that field (because of their 
extensive expertise). A weak expert, on the other hand, might be someone like a recent 
PhD in physics. Suppose, then, that the weak expert makes some controversial assertion, 
p, about quantum mechanics. In virtue of the role the recent PhD occupies (e.g. that of a 
university lecturer), the norm of assertion to which he must adhere is, again, that of 
understanding why p is evaluated as being as it is27. We contend, then, that this kind of 
atomistic understanding will also be norm of assertion in many cases involving a speaker 
who occupies an institutional role that carries with it the expectation of weak expertise. 
Although it has been uncontroversial to make the (usually tacit) assumption that 
what is most relevant is the quantity of epistemic support for an assertion, we have now 
seen that assertions grounded in knowledge or in extremely high degrees of justification 
can sometimes nonetheless be epistemically inappropriate. Since we have shown that the 
quality of epistemic support possessed by an assertion is also important, we submit that to 
make progress in theorising about norms of assertion we must focus on quality as well as 
(or perhaps even largely instead of) quantity of support. An important upshot of our view 
here is that one can plausibly reject the knowledge norm of assertion whilst nonetheless 
endorsing atomistic understanding as a norm of assertion, and this is a state of affairs that 
                                                
26 Note that the expected familiarity we have of the maths teacher (in virtue of her occupation of that role) 
is not that she explain why an answer is wrong by explaining both where mistakes are and why the axioms 
themselves are true (a deep philosophical problem). It is common sense that we don’t expect such a thing of 
maths teachers (particularly at that level), but rather merely expect that they know the relevant axioms and 
how to apply them (and expect that they be able to correct students on the basis of whether they applied 
these axioms correctly). We can therefore dispel the potential objection that, in virtue of being able to 
explain why some student gave the wrong answer, the maths teacher would also have to be able to explain 
why the fundamental truths of mathematics are what they are (or any of the sorts of questions that 
philosophers of maths might ask). The relevant familiarity apposite to her institutional role is not so 
demanding, but it is nonetheless demanding enough to make her assertion epistemically unwarranted when 
she could say nothing more to a student about why his answer is wrong than ‘the answer key says so.’ 
27 For a strong expert, the norm of assertion would be different because we hold strong experts 
epistemically accountable to a greater extent and in a different sort of way. For example, we expect that 
when Stephen Hawking says p that, because of his role as world-class leader in the field of quantum 
mechanics, he would be able (if challenged) to locate p within much broader and deeper contexts of 
explanation than, say, the recent PhD in our above example—contexts of the sort that would require, we 
think, objectual understanding of quantum mechanics (something that runs much deeper than what we 
expect someone to possess simply in virtue of occupying the position of university lecturer in physics). 
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this has significant and interesting further implications. For one thing, it supports the 
claim that understanding and knowledge are interestingly different. It also supports the 
related thesis that understanding might bear epistemic value that knowledge lacks. The 
suggestion here is that—at least regarding certain types of assertions—the failure of 
knowledge to qualify as ‘sufficient’ epistemic credentials to warrant assertion in some 
cases motivates the thought that understanding is of a higher quality qua epistemic state 
(because certain kinds of understanding would warrant assertion in these cases). We do 
not intend to argue for any of these further claims here, and nor should we be taken to 
endorse them, but we think it at least worth noting that they are potentially fruitful 
avenues for further research. 
3.2  
 
An obvious objection to the proposal we have been advancing in this section is that, in 
some cases, the relevant epistemic credential to warrant assertion really does seem to be 
merely knowledge, or reasonable belief.28 Therefore, our opponent could say, even if 
understanding is the epistemic credential of which we need to be in possession to make 
proper assertions in some cases, it is not resultantly also the case that all proper assertions 
demand understanding. In sum, the proposal that understanding is the norm of assertion 
is false. 
We accept this wholeheartedly. Indeed, we do not wish to advance the very strong 
claim that understanding is the norm of assertion. Generalised to all assertions, this claim 
is false. It is important to see that our claim is rather that understanding is the norm of 
assertion for a restricted class of assertions—this much alone is sufficient to show that 
the quantitative thesis is false and that any proposed norm of assertion that is logically 
dependent on said thesis is therefore also false. What we’ve argued for, specifically, is 
that the quantitative view is false precisely because, for some cases of assertion, 
understanding (i.e. not merely an increased quantity of epistemic support but rather a 
different kind of epistemic support) is the norm that correctly governs assertion. In light 
of our accepting that understanding is the norm of only some assertions, we would want 
to side with those who take there to be multiple epistemic norms of assertion, and we 
allow that understanding is the norm of just one class of assertions (while some 
justification-focused norm, for example, is the norm of a different class of assertions)29. 
We will now turn to look at a further thesis that we are thereby committed to—one that, if 
right, stands to undercut another important and misleading assumption motivating the 
contemporary debate. 
 
                                                
28 Obviously, there are indeed many proper assertions for which any kind of understanding is not a 
necessary condition—for example, ‘the bird is yellow’ (an assertion of perceptual knowledge) does not 
require being able to fill out any further claim including the word ‘because’ before that particular assertion 
counts as permissible.  
29 Notice that we are not trying to name or rigidly define the wider class governed by atomistic 
understanding as a norm of assertion—that is a further task that we clearly do not need to accomplish here. 
Here, our goal has simply been to show that there are cases where atomistic understanding is the norm of 
assertion. 
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4.  
 
In this final section, we build upon our conclusions in §2 and §3 by taking critical aim at 
the almost unanimously endorsed position we call the universalisability of (epistemic) 
assertoric norms (hereafter, UAN). This is the view that: 
 
Universalisability of (epistemic) assertoric norms (UAN): Some epistemic rule 
R governs some assertions only if it governs all assertions uniformly. 
 
A denial of UAN would allow for the possibility that some epistemic rule governs some 
assertions whilst some other rule governs other assertions. That UAN, rather than its 
denial, is correct, is taken for granted by all those who purport to defend some unique 
epistemic rule (e.g. the knowledge norm, justification norm or truth norm) as one that 
they take must exhaustively account for how all assertions are epistemically constrained. 
Put simply: to assume UAN (as most all have) is to assume that if one norm governs 
some assertions, then it governs them all equally. This is something we’ve denied in §3 
by arguing that only some assertions are constrained by the atomistic understanding 
norm. Unsurprisingly, those who assume UAN are presupposing that there is some way 
that assertions are normatively constrained (from an epistemic point of view), and so, by 
UAN, they seek one norm that they suppose must therefore exclusively constrain all 
assertions (such as the KNA, JNA or TNA).30 But why exactly should we presuppose 
UAN, rather than to deny it (or remain neutral with respect to it), prior to investigating 
which epistemic norm (or norms) constrain assertions? This is far from clear. 
 The modus operandi whereby UAN is taken for granted owes in no small part to 
Williamson’s (1996) defence of the knowledge norm, one that has effectively set the tone 
for much of the contemporary debate. Perhaps—and treading charitably—it would suffice 
to say “Following Williamson’s precedent, I’ll assume UAN” so long as it could be 
demonstrated (or is obvious) that Williamson has offered some compelling argument for 
UAN. However, as Jessica Brown (2008) observes:  
 
“Williamson provides no argument for the assumption of uniqueness when he introduces it” (Brown 2008: 
97; my italics) 
 
Brown is indeed right on this point. Williamson thinks merely ceteris paribus that a 
simple (unique) account—one that would constrain any assertion by constraining them all 
uniformly—should be preferred to a more complex account whereby not all assertions are 
answerable to the same epistemic norm. Says Williamson: 
  
                                                
30 A point of nuance is worth noting here: denying that some epistemic norm must constrain all assertions if 
constraining some assertions is compatible with an endorsement of some norm that governs all assertions. 
After all, one could endorse some epistemic norm N1 as one to which all assertions are answerable along 
side some other epistemic norm N2 to which only some assertions are criticisable. Were one to endorse 
such a position, she would be denying UAN even while maintaining N1 as an epistemic norm to which all 
assertions are answerable. This sort of position (which features a denial of UAN) is unavailable to the 
mainstream debate in virtue of its presupposing that there can not be ‘partial scope’ epistemic norms—such 
as the atomistic understanding norm we considered—which only constrain some restricted class of 
assertions.  
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“There might be several rules of assertion. There might be one…Nevertheless, a simple account of 
assertion would be theoretically satisfying, if it worked.” (Williamson 2000: 242). 
 
Williamson thinks the knowledge account works, and that a fortiori a simple account 
works. However, because we’ve shown rigorously in §1-3 that the knowledge account 
doesn’t work (by showing that some assertions require atomistic understanding as the 
requisite epistemic credential to warrant assertion), we’ve effectively undercut this 
particular avenue of support for UAN.31 Williamson might have a further argument32 
available in favour of UAN were he able to positively show something to be wrong with 
more complex accounts, other than that they are complex. Alas, though, Williamson 
admits that, in arguing for knowledge account (1996; 2000), he is effectively “shirking 
the examination of more complex accounts” (2000: 242), and so he gives us no other 
argument. Consequently, we have no positive reason to accept UAN that could serve to 
offset the overwhelming reasons we’ve shown for denying it. 
 As it turns out, then, the observation that atomistic understanding governs at least 
some (though not all) assertions carries with it some weighty outcomes. They are, in brief 
sum, that: 
 
(i) Regardless of whether knowledge is necessary to warrant assertion, 
knowledge is not sufficient to warrant assertion (i.e. SUFF is false). (§2) 
 
(ii) It is not the case that the question “What is the norm of assertion?” is best  
answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant 
assertion. (i.e. the quantitative view is false). (§3) 
 
(iii) It’s not the case that some epistemic rule governs some assertions, then 
that rule governs all assertions (i.e. UAN is false). (§4) 
 
 An upshot of these results is that, when tackling the problem of specifying some 
epistemic norm (or norms) of assertion, we should adopt a radically different modus 
operandi than that which has been traditionally assumed from the outset by traditional 
approaches. The right approach, we’ve shown, would be one that countenances the fact 
that quality, and not just quantity, of epistemic support is relevant to discussions of 
assertoric norms. Furthermore, we should enter the debate without the prior 
presupposition that any epistemic norm would govern some class of assertions only if 
                                                
31 Also, as a point to note, even if Williamson successfully defended the knowledge rule (which we’ve 
contended that he doesn’t), this would not in itself prove UAN because (as was suggested in fn. 24) the 
admission of one epistemic norm that governs all assertions is compatible with a further endorsement of 
some other epistemic norm that governs only some assertions. 
32 Jessica Brown (2008: 98) considers the sort of argument Williamson would have had to provide, but 
doesn’t, to this end. She notes aptly that: “Williamson might offer a different defence of the uniqueness 
assumption. He might argue that if we can explain all the data concerning assertion by the assumption that 
it is governed by a unique constitutive rule, then it is gratuitous to assume that assertion is governed by 
more than one constitutive rule. He may say that the onus is on the proponent of a more complex account of 
assertion to point to data which cannot be explained on his simple account. Only if the proponent of the 
more complex account is able to do this is there any reason to suppose that assertion is governed by more 
than one constitutive rule.” (2008: 98) 
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universalisable so as to constrain all assertions uniformly. This is a considerable 
departure from the assumptions presently guiding the contemporary debate.  
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